What’s wrong with rendering?

Oh I dunno, maybe something with almost 700 comments? (HDR).

However session saving is very important for any work, especially office tasks. It’s becoming critical now when all major DEs make Wayland the default.

If apps don’t want to save their state when they close there isn’t much a window manager can do about that. The only part the window manager would be involved in is with positioning its window and that is hardly something very critical to the functionality of an app.

Accent colors are coming with GNOME 47.

There were talks a few years ago about changing sd-tmpfiles name but it was decide not worth it due to the churn and bikeshedding it would cause.

sd-tmpfiles is generally used to create, modify (e.g. permissions) and remove directories on the system. The home.conf is intended for systems that only ship /usr/ (e.g. containers) to create /home/ and /srv/ as a separate subvolume on btrfs

The BSOD really isn’t something to be mad at, it actually in theory is good but there is only so much you can do when a kernel panics. What you should be mad at is shitty drivers causing BSODs

which definitely seems out of scope.

Doesn’t seem out of scope for a system and service management suite. Like, the timeperiod where systemd was “just an init” was relativly brief (like half a year).

They should test this much more often and frequently. Unlike Gnome, KDE do actually care about their users, not just about themselves.

It’s not like GNOME is the only outlier here (for the specific icon problem sure), someone on the linux subreddid also posted this screenshot https://imgur.com/a/1ELtsJb. It seems to really just be that KDE apps kinda struggle out side of KDE. And most of the GNOME devs do care about the users as well, just they also care that their apps look as intended.

It’s been a thing I personally have been wondering why this is how it is for a while. Personally I like most of the GNOME stuff, but this decision has always stood out as odd.

But then again I almost always use ctrl+w or alt-f4 to close apps, so I am mostly unaffected.

doas is relativly simple (a few hundred LOC), especially compared to sudo. The main benefit of run0 over doas is that it isn’t a SUID binary, they are similary complex.

Basically. systemd-run was already able to do it, all that really changed is the interface for it. The change to run.c in the patch itself was <400LOC, and the entire patch was <1.4k lines with most being docs, tests and utils for coloring the terminal.

I don’t understand how this is any improvement over pkexec

That has the same problem as sudo: the SUID bit is set for it.

The fact that run0 uses polkit is more of a byproduct that this kinda authentication is already done with polkit all over the place in systemd. You can have individual subcommand accessible to different users (for example everyone can systemctl status, but systemctl reboot needs to be in the wheel group) which is why its generally used within systemd already. And it wouldn’t surprise me if again you can do it with this as well, limiting what commands can unconditionally run, need prompt or are completely blocked.

This has already been possible, the patch modifying run.c to be able to do this is not even 400 lines long and was mostly just exposing its feature in a different way. (the entire patch was <1.5k lines, with most being docs, tests and a bit of plumbing for the colored terminal)

As the other comment said, no. But I’ve had the idea and will to at some point write a edit script (that I can just set EDITOR= to) that would just choose one of the first common editors. That could in theory have a -0 option to run as root (there also probably looking through run0, doas, sudo and su). Not the editor, but doing the editing on a temp file and then copying with root

I don’t know, unless I personally allow the admin to have that kinda access to my files I wouldn’t really want it. And for that case you can enroll recovery keys (which would need to be manually stored, but still) or a fido token or whatever other supported mechanism there is, its LUKS2 backed encryption after all. Then there is also the possibility to just not encrypt the home directory at all.

1. The attack surface is there either way, this is just functionality repackaged that existed already before (systemd-run, which is calling into PID1)
2. all compression libraries (actually most libraries at this point) are dlopened on demand (which was planned even before the attack, which is speculated that the attack was accelerated in timeline because he was on a timer before the change was released)

I guess my interpretation was too charitable.

Nothing in the protocol prevents you from splitting the server from the window manager, just everyone implementing the wayland server protocol didn’t see any benefit in splitting it out.

I think what they meant is that there are people that think: “Wayland is too fragmented, there should be 1 ‘Wayland Compositor’ and the rest should be window managers”

This isn’t exactly a “new” attack surface, so removing the attack surface that sudo (and alternatives) is, is probably a net positive.

it does its authorization with polkit (which IIRC defaults to allow all wheel group members) and giving users that shouldn’t be allowed root access, root access, is not something you ever want. This is usually referred to as unauthorized privilege escalation. Also, it isn’t like sudo doesn’t need configuration.

One way to notice a person has “systemd derangement syndrome” is by looking at how they write systemd: if they write it SystemD they are already in late stages of SDS and it isn’t curable anymore.

homed isn’t exactly a home directory replacement, more of an extension. You can mix and match homed and normal home directories like you want (on a per-user basis at least, not within a single user). It does have some nice things, such as user-password based encryption of the home directory, so the password is required to unlock it (no admin access) or automatically using subvolumes on btrfs.